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1 Introduction 
The thesis assesses one of the core problems arising in international investment law, namely, 
the conflicts that international investment treaties may create with other international 
agreements. This topic is so important because investment treaties are primarily intended to 
protect the interests of foreign investors, and do not clarify how they relate to other 
international agreements protecting interests that may compete with the interests of foreign 
investors. Tensions exist, inter alia, between international investment law and other branches of 
international law, such as human rights, international environmental, and EU law. These 
tensions are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of international investment law as a law 
governed by several thousand bilateral treaties. Ultimately, the multiple problems of 
fragmentation may put the legitimacy of international investment treaties and investor-state 
arbitration into question. This summary gives an overview of the approach, methods questions, 
hypothesis, presentation, and findings of the research, which are elaborated on in the 200 pages 
of the original thesis.  
1. Approach 
Differently from several other authors that criticise international investment law fundamentally 
and advocate for institutional change, I propose as a solution to the fragmentation problem to 
go back to the principles of general international law relating to international treaties and to 
the law of sources. My research does not attempt a reconceptualization of international 
investment obligations, but it elaborates on the implications for states and foreign investors of 
other international obligations arising from non-investment treaties. The thesis therefore 
stresses that international investment law cannot be seen in isolation from the rest of 
international law; that principles of treaty interpretation mandate taking into account other 
international legal obligations under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties; and that investor-state arbitral tribunals should make use of balancing as an 
interpretative technique to deal with conflicting rights and interests. Accordingly, this requires 
arbitral tribunals to realign their interpretative methodologies and practice in order to establish 
the investor-state arbitration as a legitimate system of rights adjudication. 
The argument is developed that investment tribunals should make decisions based on a 
balancing of economic and other values where these are in issue. This is required as such 
tribunals must apply the rules of treaty interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. This includes a duty to interpret international treaties in the light of 
international law in general. Thus where a case raises issues covered by other international 
agreements such as environmental protection, health and safety or human rights, the tribunal is 
bound to take into account the standards contained in these other agreements when 
determining the scope and meaning of the investment agreement before it. 
 
In my opinion, a global agreement on investment or a complete structural reformation of the 
investor-state arbitral system is not necessary, although it is also highly improbably, to address 
the concerns about system’s legitimacy. Instead, investor-state arbitral tribunals need to identify 
and take up the issues of treaty conflicts and develop interpretive and conflict resolution 
techniques to resolve them. I contend that the VLCT Article 31(3) (c) equips investor-state 
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arbitral tribunals with the required jurisdiction to take self-initiated cognisance of rights and 
obligation arising from non-investment treaties that have direct bearing on an investment 
dispute. Once tribunals have assumed jurisdiction to consider and apply non-investment 
treaties while interpreting investment treaties, the important questions of normative overlaps 
and conflicts would arise. 
The research discusses the effects of cross-fertilisation of investment and non-investment 
treaties when their respective norms reciprocate and complement each other, resulting in 
jurisprudential development through inter-regime transplants. The research explains how such 
cross-fertilisation of treaties can results in unavoidable normative conflicts in some instances, 
and also how such conflicts can arise from within the investment treaties regime. After critical 
assessment of the inter-temporal rules to resolve treaty conflicts that are found within and 
outside the VCLT, this research assesses the role of value-oriented reasoning which 
international dispute settlement systems have developed for the resolution of treaty conflicts, 
and suggests the doctrinal, methodological and practical possibilities for the employment of 
such reasoning by investor-state tribunals. This would lead to achieving a balance in 
determining the amount of compensation payable to foreign investors for violations by host 
states of investment treaty rights when such violations are directly attributable to conflicting 
non-investment obligations.  
Therefore, my research suggests legally and practically plausible paradigms that investor-state 
arbitral tribunals can use in their adjudicative techniques, interpretive methodologies, and 
remedial mechanisms to resolve normative conflicts present in investment and non-investment 
treaties. If investor-state tribunals follow these methodological and adjudicative techniques, they 
would not only effectively address issues pertaining to the system’s legitimacy but also develop 
concrete substantive rules of international investment law that are coherent with other parallel 
systems existing within international law.  
Undeniably, future investment treaty practice will also play an important role in reconstructing 
the normative framework of international investment law. However, the focus of this research 
remains on the present edifice of investment arbitration which thousands of existing 
investment treaties have created, and where investment treaty norms are being constantly tested 
and are evolving through the process of treaty interpretation. The question of how future 
investment treaties should be drafted to ensure that tribunals undertake the balancing of values 
is, therefore, beyond the scope of this research.  
2. Research Methods 
The general research methods employed in this research are doctrinal analysis of evolving 
jurisprudence of international investment law and investigation of its cross-fertilisation with 
other systems or regimes of international law, especially with international human rights 
regime. I have used the rights to health, safety and the environment as an example of human 
rights because state regulations in these areas are the most common means of domestic 
implementation of international human rights obligations. However, the analysis in this 
research possibly extends to all types of human rights.  
The primary means of analysis is cases decided by international courts and arbitral tribunals. 
The analysis is based on the similarities and differences in the interpretive reasoning of such 
courts and tribunals. There are doctrinal differences between the precedential strength and 
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value of an arbitral award compared to a decision of an international court. However, the 
continuously increasing, uncontested and consistent modern jurisprudence of the investor-state 
arbitral tribunals is likely to become part of the authoritative source of international law similar 
to other judicial decisions. Modern arbitral jurisprudence may eventually develop into 
international custom that has a greater legally binding effect, particularly when arbitral 
jurisprudence defines the general principles of law in a contemporary treaty and factual context. 
Furthermore, where arbitral tribunals commonly recognise the persuasive value of earlier 
arbitral awards, there is a tendency to gradually increase the persuasion level to a “duty” to 
adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases, which could be discarded only on 
compelling contrary grounds. This tendency reflects the fact that arbitral tribunals have a deep 
rooted perception of the unity of international investment law, which would gradually develop 
the overarching rules applicable to all investment disputes.  
I have also discussed issues arising in this research in the light of prevalent ideologies and legal 
doctrines that eminent scholars of international law have offered on the subject. Additionally, a 
section of the research presents an empirical analysis of a comprehensive collection of 
numerical data of bilateral investment treaties of the EU member states.  
3. Research questions 
 
As indicated, the primary modus operandi of this research has remained the examination of 
methodologies and reasoning that investor-state arbitral tribunals have used when determining 
the rights and liabilities of foreign investors and host states. The biggest problem with the 
investor-state arbitral system is the ambiguity over the extent to which the system allows 
balancing foreign investors’ interests against the broader public interests, especially when the 
host states are under another international treaty obligation to protect those interests. These 
increasingly conflicting interests pose a serious challenge to the system’s normative framework. 
The present reluctance of arbitral tribunals to interpret and apply investment treaties in the 
purview of non-investment treaty obligations by utilising the available interpretive bases, and 
their failure to balance the conflicting rights and obligations arising from different treaties by 
utilising the available principles and rules of international law is posing a serious threat to the 
system’s legitimacy. In this context, my research has addressed the following questions: 
 
1. How has the present investor-state arbitral system evolved? 
 
a. Whether the current investor-state arbitral system developed harmoniously, 
aligned with the policy objectives and interests of variant international actors 
including developed and developing states, international institutions and 
multinational businesses? 
b. How does the present investor-state arbitral system operate? 
c. Have the investor-state arbitral tribunals applied the emerging international 
investment norms consistently to ensure that the entire system develops such 
adjudicative principles as subscribe them a legitimate system of rights 
adjudication?  
 
2. What are different normative functions that can be ascribed to investment treaties? 
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a. Are the objects and purposes of investment treaties restricted only to the 
protection of foreign investors’ rights, or do they expressly or impliedly extend 
to the protection of citizens’ rights to health, safety and the environment? 
b. What legal bases are available to tribunals within parameters of investment 
treaty regime to reformulate and balance the foreign investors’ rights against the 
rights of citizens? 
 
3. What are the available policy options for investor-state arbitral tribunals to address the 
system’s legitimacy deficit? 
 
a. What should be the policy dimensions for tribunals to transform international 
investment arbitration into a collective value system, protecting foreign 
investors’ rights as well as higher development objectives, giving room for and 
safeguarding greater public policy objectives? 
b. The investor-state arbitral system is broadly premised on the application and 
interpretation of investment treaties. Are there principles or rules applicable to 
the interpretation of treaties that tribunals can use to realign their 
interpretations for addressing the system’s legitimacy concerns and to transform 
the investor-state arbitration into a collective value system?  
 
4. What is the relationship between the investor-state arbitral system and other systems of 
international law? 
 
a. Are the rights and obligations that states have acquired under non-investment 
treaties relevant in the interpretation of investment treaties?  
b. Do investor-state arbitral tribunals need to develop methodologies to integrate 
this ostensibly autonomous system within the broader normative structures or 
systems of non-investment treaties, such as human rights and environmental 
protection treaties? If so, what doctrinal bases are available in the law of treaties 
to develop such methodologies? 
c. Do tribunals have jurisdiction, competency or power to consider and apply the 
obligations acquired by states under non-investment treaties when interpreting 
investment treaties? 
d. How do investment treaties interact with regional economic integration treaties, 
such as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)?    
 
5. Is there a hierarchy of conflicting treaty norms? 
 
a. How do investment treaty obligations potentially conflict with obligations 
arising from non-investment treaties?  
b. How would or should tribunals resolve the potential conflicts between 
investment treaties and non-investment treaties?  
c. How should tribunals resolve the system’s internal conflicts arising from 
different objects and purposes of a combination of two or more investment 
treaties that are relevant and applicable to the subject matter of a dispute? 
d. How should tribunals choose between two mutually inconsistent and conflicting 
provisions within an investment treaty? 
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e. Are the general international law principles and rules of priority between 
conflicting treaties workable in the investor-state arbitral system or the system 
should devise its indigenous rules of priority, while benefiting from the general 
principles and rules?    
All of these questions share some degree of overlap and meet at different levels of enquiry in 
this research. The questions address the serious challenges facing investor-state arbitration to 
develop as a legitimate, coherent, reliable and useful system of rights adjudication based on 
collective values for both developed and developing countries as well as their citizens.  
 
4. Hypothesis 
 
The primary hypothesis is that investor-state arbitral tribunals need to develop a pragmatic 
approach in their interpretive methods with a view to achieving the system’s integration into 
the normative framework of international law. This integration would result from:  
 
1. Clarifications of the nature, content and scope of the principles and rules of 
international investment law; 
2. Refinement of the adjudicative methodologies to assure that tribunals take cognisance 
of the norms, rights and obligations arising from non-investment treaties that conflict 
with investment treaties; and  
3. Developing the normative framework to resolve these conflicts by balancing and 
prioritising conflicting obligations.  
 
The theme of this research is that the entire corpus of the investor-state arbitral system needs to 
develop a new approach to the ways tribunals determine rights and duties of states and foreign 
investors, and how they interpret and implement investment treaties. In order to address the 
broader human rights and public interest concerns, all stakeholders should be able to draw on 
the investor-state arbitral system effectively and efficiently. The normative evolution of the 
investment principles and rules is progressing on the bases of the investor-state arbitral system’s 
own particular philosophy and unique characteristics, which would result in the formulation of 
distinct rules of international investment law. However, investor-state arbitral tribunals must be 
conscious that this normative formulation remains collaborative and develops within the 
parameters of other branches of international law, and of established international norms that 
require promotion of collective good and protection of universal values.  
As investor-state arbitral tribunals are the formative place of international investment law, they 
must assume the adjudicative duty of constructing the system as a distinct but internally and 
externally coherent legal regime which takes account of the rights and obligations of every stake-
holder when determining the rights and obligations under investment treaties. This would 
develop the investor-state arbitral system as a system of collective values having the capacity to 
resolve frictions arising from increasingly overlapping and incompatible obligations that states 
have acquired in investment and non-investment treaties. This would also re-establish the role 
of treaties as a means for orderly and peaceful settlement of international disputes by providing 
pragmatic explanation for states to continue benefiting from the multifaceted and multipurpose 
utilisation of treaties in their international dealings. 
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The investor-state arbitral system’s phenomenal but incoherent evolution, divergent views of its 
success, and the increasing normative interaction with other systems of international law 
suggest that the system is now poised at a critical crossroads. The system is facing grave concerns 
about its legitimacy but simultaneously has an opportunity to address these concerns by 
realigning and readjusting its adjudicative methodologies.  
5. Beneficiaries and stakeholders   
The primary audiences for this research are international investment arbitrators, arbitration 
centres and international lawyers. The primary beneficiaries are individuals who do not always 
have the opportunity or even the legal capacity to protect their rights and interests in the 
decentralised and state-focused system of international law. Human and environmental rights 
activists, groups, organisations, and lawyers will also greatly benefit from this research. Other 
beneficiaries include states that have concluded investment treaties, and foreign investors who 
are subjects of those treaties, since sustainable development is a value shared by all. The 
research is applicable to existing and future investor-state disputes, and will also help foreign 
investment strategists and policy makers. At the time of writing, there are a total 227 concluded 
and 141 pending cases at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) alone. 
6. Structure and presentation of research 
The thesis consists of the following five previously published articles. Short abstracts of the 
articles are provided here. 
1. The evolution of bilateral investment treaties, investment treaty arbitration and 
international investment law, International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 6, 
pages 189-204, December 2011. 
This article explores the evolution of the current regime involving foreign direct investment, 
bilateral investment treaties and investment treaty arbitration. It considers why a harmonised 
multilateral investment agreement has never been adopted. It reflects on past attempts to 
harmonise the customary foreign direct investment regime, the resolution of investment 
disputes over the past century, and the establishment of arbitration centres across the world. It 
looks at how investor-state arbitral system works and how its substantive norms can potentially 
conflict with obligations arising from international trade agreements. 
2. Investment treaty arbitration and the development of international investment law as 
a ‘Collective Value System’: A synopsis of a new synthesis, Journal of World 
Investment and Trade, Volume 10, Number 6, pages 921-936, December 2009. 
This article provides a critical account of the development of investor-state arbitration and 
ensuing substantive rules of international investment law. It examines the emerging design of 
international investment law as a distinct substantive regime within international law. This is 
followed by an analysis of the views of known scholars on the determination of substantive 
rules of international investment law, highlighting the controversies and problems within the 
investor-state arbitral system. After illuminating the problems arising from conflicting arbitral 
awards and the complicated nexus of international obligations that states have acquired, the 
article argues that solution to the investor-state arbitral system’s problems is in finding new 
foundations for the system based on solid substantive rules and the realisation and affirmation 
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of collective values. The article sets out a road map for the accomplishment of this collective 
value system.  
3. Positing for balancing: Investment treaty rights and the rights of citizens, 
Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Volume 4, Number 1, pages 95-119, May 
2011. 
Substantive bilateral investment treaty rules have the potential to undermine the rights to 
health, safety and the environment of the citizens of host states if stricter state regulations to 
protect these rights amount to regulatory expropriation or breach other investment treaty 
rights. This article argues that bilateral investment treaty rules are comparable with, and stand 
parallel to, the domestic laws of host states and investor-state arbitral tribunals should balance 
these rights when they conflict with each other. Tribunals act as de facto courts since they 
enforce rights that are assertable against the public at large and not against the host state alone. 
Similar to the bilateral investment treaty “rules”, an analysis of the legal nature of “rights” 
created by BITs also reveals that these rights are comparable with the domestic law rights. The 
article articulates three legal arguments founded on substantive bilateral investment treaty 
clauses, human rights, and property rights on the basis of which, three specific rights, i.e., the 
rights to health, safety and the environment of citizens of host states may stand parallel to the 
rights that bilateral investment treaties create for foreign investors. These arguments, both 
individually and taken together, call for balancing these citizens’ rights with the rights of foreign 
investors in the event of their conflict. 
4. Determining hierarchy between conflicting treaties: Are there vertical rules in the 
horizontal system? Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, Issue 2, June 2012. 
This article addresses the general issues of treaty conflicts and their resolution in international 
law. Treaties are contractual instruments that may provide special rules of priority in case they 
conflict with other treaties. When a treaty does not provide such rules, however, priority is 
determined by the rules of the VCLT and/or general principles of law. This article argues that 
both the VCLT and general principles of law do not provide an adequate solution to treaty 
conflicts. It suggests that the solution to treaty conflicts rests in a value-oriented reading of 
international law and treaty norms. Norms represent values and values represent interests or 
benefits for which the international society requires protection. Conflicts of treaty norms are, 
therefore, conflicts of values that courts and dispute settlement bodies resolve by ordering a 
hierarchy of competing interests, and by protecting the most important interests in a given 
context.  
5. Resolving incompatibilities of bilateral investment treaties of the EU Member States 
with the EC Treaty: Individual and collective options, European Law Journal, 
Volume 16, Issue 6, pages 806–830, November 2010. 
Bilateral investment treaties concluded by the Member States of the European Union contain 
substantially similar clauses, including free movement of capital and dispute resolution through 
investor-state arbitration. Article 307 EC Treaty (present Article 351 TFEU) provides for the 
primacy of pre-accession treaties over the EC Treaty and simultaneously requires the Member 
States to eliminate their mutual incompatibilities. The European Court of Justice has declared 
that the free movement of capital clauses of Austrian and Swedish pre-accession extra-EU BITs 
are incompatible with the EC Treaty as they will impede future restrictions on the movement of 
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capital imposed by Community legislation. A similar “free movement of capital” clause is 
present in all extra-EU BITs of the Member States, whether pre- or post-accession. Article 307, 
however, does not apply to the post-accession treaties, which are equally capable of achieving 
the same results of impeding the application of the EC Treaty. In addition, the application of 
intra-EU BITs gives investors from BIT party states access to the investor-state arbitration, 
which is not available to the investors from those Member States that do not have BITs with 
other Member States. This is discrimination and may distort the principle of equal treatment 
within the EU. Furthermore, the newly acceding EU Member States are facing extensive 
arbitral claims for carrying out the BIT-EU conflicting obligations within their respective 
territories. There is a need to identify and explain rules for the resolution of these conflicts.   
7. Findings 
The normative framework of customary international law for foreign direct investment has 
remained disputed among developed and developing countries throughout modern history. On 
one hand, developed countries insisted on full protection and security for their citizens’ assets 
abroad, and payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation for any expropriations. 
On the other hand, developing countries have traditionally asserted their right to expropriate 
and payment of compensation in accordance with their domestic standards. The customary 
rules of diplomatic protection of citizens’ assets abroad also remained problematic and 
inadequate. The UN General Assembly, the OECD, and several other forums made 
unsuccessful efforts to bring the international community to an agreement on the substantive 
norms governing foreign direct investment. The normative paradigm of foreign direct 
investment has now shifted from the customary international law to investment treaties. With 
several thousand bilateral investment treaties and chapters on investment in free trade 
agreements, we now have an extensive and complex network of treaties providing substantive 
and procedural protections to foreign investors. Most of the near 400 known decided and 
pending investor-state disputes before international investment tribunals applied and would 
apply the rules and principles of international investment law that essentially emerge from 
investment treaties.       
The decisions of investor-state tribunals determine rights that are assertable against the entire 
world and not merely against the defending states. Awards of these tribunals not only decide 
the matters in dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, these awards have 
implications for other treaty regimes and for the overall development of international law. 
Investor-state arbitral tribunals are under enormous pressure by legal scholars, human rights 
groups and non-governmental organisations to take cognisance of applicable public interests 
when deciding investment disputes. The entire structure of the investor-state arbitral system 
revolves around the interpretation of investment treaties and this research has demonstrated 
that a wide variety of sources of international law, as well as international investment law, 
provide that investment treaties do not operate in isolation from other non-investment treaties 
that states parties to an investment treaty have concluded. The principle of systemic integration 
of treaties, the minimum requirements of justice, considerations of domestic and international 
public policy, and the overall normative environment: all support the relevance and application 
of party states’ other treaties when interpreting investment treaties.  
Where the relevance and application of non-investment treaties for the interpretation of 
investment treaties is clearly established, non-investment treaties cross-fertilise or interact with 
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investment treaties in two important ways. First, a non-investment treaty may provide 
jurisprudential explanation for the substantive rules and principles that are common in both 
types of treaties. Secondly, a non-investment treaty may provide rules or principles that are 
incompatible with an investment treaty and play a supervisory or overriding role in investor-
state arbitration. The practice of investor-state arbitral tribunals reveals somewhat inconsistent 
and disguised presence of both these types of treaty interactions. However, tribunals have not 
clearly established normative bases and doctrinal justifications for the supervisory interactions, 
and have not fully materialised the functional outcomes and potential benefits that can be 
realised from such interactions. 
This research showed how in particular settings various investment and non-investment treaty 
interactions may result in serious treaty conflicts. Investor-state tribunals as treaty interpreters 
are obligated by the requirements of justice prescribed by the UN Charter and the VCLT and 
by the principle of systemic integration provided by the VCLT Article 31(3) (c) to take 
cognisance of treaty conflicts emerging from cross-fertilisation of treaties and to effectively 
resolve these conflicts in order to satisfy the ends of justice and to develop the investor-state 
arbitral system as a legitimate system of rights adjudication. Investor-state tribunals have a 
timely and perfect opportunity to clarify that the application of non-investment treaties on 
investor-state disputes is required by the VCLT Article 31(3) (c). Such direct application of non-
investment treaties on investor-state disputes is necessary not only to align the development of 
investment norms within the broader normative framework of public international law but also 
to strengthen the system’s integrity, to bring consistency and interpretive balance pivotal for 
value judgements, and to disprove the allegations of undermining public interests levelled 
against the system.  
This research has also revealed that the normative conflicts in investment treaty arbitration do 
not always emerge from their interaction with non-investment treaties. In some cases, the 
distinct investment and non-investment objects and purposes contained within investment 
treaties may also result in conflict with each other. Similar conflicts also arise from the 
combined application of the ICSID Convention and BITs, again based on their variant 
economic and non-economic objects and purposes. To resolve all these conflicts, whether 
between two investment treaties or within an investment treaty, tribunals need to balance 
between competing treaty norms. Where the conflicting norms are so far incompatible with 
each other that they cannot be simultaneously applied, tribunals need to determine hierarchy 
between conflicting treaty norms. Additionally, when BIT rules, which are primarily 
commercial and private in nature, collide with the public in nature and internationally valued 
rules present in domestic laws, tribunals need to balance these colliding rules to achieve a just 
settlement of disputes.   
Further on the need for balancing, and from a different perspective, analysis of the BITs’ 
substantive “rules” reveals that these rules are also potentially discriminatory against the citizens 
of host states because they create more favourable procedural and substantive rights for foreign 
investors. A similar “rights” based analysis of BITs highlights that the rights of foreign investors 
under BITs can be divided into private and public rights. They are private to the extent of the 
right to supra-national arbitration, which is assertable against the host state alone acting as an 
international person. The other substantive rights given by BITs, such as the right to fair and 
equitable treatment or full protection and security, to foreign investors are public rights in 
nature since they are assertable against the public at large including the citizens of the host 
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state. This legal dynamic calls for balancing because it makes the investor’s rights comparable to 
those rights of the citizens that are present in BITs, or that can be impliedly established from 
BIT provisions (for example, the right to health, safety and the environment), or that arise from 
non-investment treaties concluded by host states.  
For the resolution of these treaty conflicts and to achieve the required balance, tribunals need 
to interpret investment treaties by applying the total sum of international law, including the 
human rights, environmental protection and development components. Tribunals must take 
account of the factual and analytic truth of conflicting state obligations arising from investment 
and non-investment treaties, and use their discretion to strike a balance between conflicting 
rights and obligations instead of unduly favouring foreign investors. However, such balancing 
requires an interpretive methodology that is based on rationalisation of treaty conflicts in terms 
of value conflicts, where conflicting values are prioritised one over the other on the bases of 
collective good and universal well-being aiming at protection of the fundamental interests of the 
mankind.  International courts and tribunals have already adopted the practice of value-based 
prioritising of interests arising from conflicting norms in two treaties or within one treaty.  
Adherence to this value-based balancing and prioritising of conflicting treaties and treaty norms 
would develop the investor-state arbitral system as a system of collective values, and will 
enhance its legitimacy and integrity as a just system for rights adjudication.  
However, investor-state tribunals are falling short on their determination of applicable 
international law to resolve treaty conflicts. They are not vigilantly monitoring and taking 
cognisance of the conflicts existing between investment and non-investment treaties. Their 
jurisdiction might be limited to a particular treaty and a dispute, but the limits of applicable law 
are set by the VCLT Article 31(3) (c), which prescribes the application of all relevant treaties in 
treaty interpretation. This is the law and interpretation method that tribunals can and must 
apply and follow. Given the increasing normative overlap and interaction between the 
international investment regime and other fields of international law, such as the WTO 
Agreements and treaties relating to the protection of environment, public health, and human 
rights, tribunals cannot interpret and apply investment treaties in isolation. In order to achieve 
coherence between international investment law and the wider spectrum of public international 
law, this research suggests that investor-state tribunals should achieve an interpretive 
compatibility between investment treaties and other rules of international law. This would 
facilitate the “systemic integration” of international law, which is required by the VCLT Article 
31(3) (c), and by the notions of justice to be maintained and promoted under the UN Charter 
and international law generally.  
As we have seen in the reasoning and interpretive approach of the Romak award and the 
dissenting opinions in the Abaclat and Tokios Tokelés arbitrations, in cases of incompatibility 
between the objects and purposes of the ICSID Convention and a BIT, the tribunals and 
individual arbitrators ultimately have to choose between the collective normative framework 
agreed in the multilateral ICSID Convention and the mutual agreements manifested in 
bilateral investment treaties. The designation of the development-oriented ICSID Convention 
as “basic” treaty on investment protections as compared to investor-oriented BITs and 
application of the ICSID Convention’s development objects and purposes when interpreting 
BITs, are positive developments in the right direction. These developments highlight the 
element of public good and collective values in the investor-state arbitration system. Although 
the Romak, Abaclat and Tokios Tokelés arbitrations involving BIT-ICSID incompatibility were 
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#2 
11 
not related to state measures directly aimed at protection of public interests, in particular fact 
situations, where the BIT-ICSID objects and purposes conflict would generate conflict between 
investment protection and non-economic development objectives of host states, similar value 
oriented interpretation, balancing or prioritisation would result in the promotion and 
protection of development objectives and public interests.    
Furthermore, in sharp contrast with foreign investors’ rights and protections, states have 
gradually strengthened the protection of public interest in the shape of rights to health, safety 
and the environment of their citizens in the latest generation of concluded and proposed BITs.  
Although such provisions in future BITs would not immediately affect the normative regime of 
several thousand existing BITs, by requiring states to maintain the regulatory regime prevailing 
at the time of entry of foreign investment, these recent and future BITs would have at least the 
effect of maintaining the status quo for the minimum level of protections available in domestic 
laws of host states for citizen’s rights to health, safety and the environment. A gradual transition 
from the modest recognition and conservation of these rights to a general authorisation of 
more abstract standards of human rights is expected in the light of increasing pressure on states 
to curtail the privileges granted to foreign investors that may prove detrimental to public 
interests. In this vein, the investor-state tribunals should also assume a positive role and develop 
the investor-state arbitral system that is responsive to the needs for balancing the rights and 
obligations of all stakeholders.  
There is no legal obstacle for the investor-state arbitral system to promote greater sustainability 
objectives and protect public interests corresponding to collective values and fundamental 
human rights. The rules and principles of treaty interpretation well equip tribunals with the 
required legal bases for the promotion of such objectives. Tribunals should endeavour to bring 
the system to a level where it has minimum inconsistencies with the general framework of 
international law and has the ability to resolve tensions between the complex webs of 
obligations acquired by states in other regional or multilateral forums vis-à-vis investment 
treaties. The tribunals’ adherence to the systemic integration of treaties will bring doctrinal 
clarifications in the system and would help alleviate the problems posed to the system’s utility. 
Without a pragmatic systemic reassessment, the legitimacy of the existing system will continue 
to be questioned. If positive steps that I have suggested in this research are not taken, the 
system may fail to harness both from within and also with its relationship with other systems of 
international law. There is a need to adopt a more balanced approach to resolve tensions 
between competing rights, interests and values, and prove that investor-state arbitration is a 
legitimate system for rights adjudication.   
In the context of intra-EU BITs and the TFEU-BITs incompatibility, investment tribunals have 
shown a strong tendency to reject the EU law arguments against their jurisdiction. The 
assumption of jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar, AES and Eureko arbitrations, despite the EU 
Commission’s and the respondent states’ strong objections, reveals the willingness of tribunals 
to secure the foreign investor’s procedural right to international arbitration granted in the 
investment treaties. Although the first post Lisbon Treaty (or TFEU) Eureko tribunal made 
some expansive assertions to distinguish the subject matters covered by the BIT and TFEU, the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals over matters relating to foreign investment would remain 
intact for a number of parallel reasons. However, the Eureko arbitration was initiated before 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and this fact gained some weight in the tribunal’s 
reasoning to avoid the application of Lisbon Treaty. Future cases may be treated differently, 
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#2 
12 
however, there is no legal impediment if tribunals are inclined to exercise jurisdiction in the 
matters coming under intra-EU BITs. As it is clear from the Eureko award, the tribunals would 
ultimately apply and decide the matter in accordance with the EU law; and, if the tribunals act 
in line with the interpretive approach proposed by this research, there are no apparent legal 
hazards if the matters pertaining to EU law are decided by the arbitral tribunals. The first step 
for the EU Commission towards blocking this jurisdiction would surely be to require its 
member states to terminate their intra-EU BITs; although such termination, if achieved, would 
not eliminate the other legal bases available for arbitral tribunals to assume and exercise their 
jurisdiction. 
 
